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Article 6

Hand: Affiliative Discrimination Theory

AFFILIATIVE DISCRIMINATION THEORY: TITLE
VII LITIGATION WITHIN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
Pierce G. Hand, IV
INTRODUCTION
In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court of the United States
reached a groundbreaking decision by reversing the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit and holding that the Fourteenth Amendment
requires states to license and recognize a marriage between two
people of the same sex.1 In reaching this holding, the Court took note
of society’s changing perspective and remarked that “changed
understandings of marriage are characteristic of a Nation where new
dimensions of freedom become apparent to new generations[.]”2 The
Court further explained, “new insights and societal understandings
can reveal unjustified inequality within our most fundamental
institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged.”3 As
proponents of same-sex marriage celebrate a victory for equal
marriage rights, employment practitioners advise that the current
cultural shift that led to Obergefell “likely signals the arrival of a
change in employment law” where sexual orientation discrimination
has not been recognized as unlawful.4 A review of the Sixth Circuit’s
precedent regarding sexual orientation discrimination within the
workplace forecasts, in agreement with practitioners, employment
discrimination as the next successful battleground for proponents of
lesbian and gay rights.

 J.D. Candidate, 2016, Georgia State University College of Law. I would like to thank my
mother, Lisa Y. Warner, and my partner, Scot R. Seitz, for their continuous love, support, and
encouragement throughout the drafting and publication of this work. I would also like to thank
Professors Lauren S. Lucas and Tanya M. Washington for their thoughtful input and inspiration.
1. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015).
2. Id. at 2596.
3. Id. at 2603.
4. David Wachtel & Karen Tanenbaum, STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES—Obergefell v. Hodges and
the Future of LGBT Rights in the Workplace, WOLTERS KLUWER EMP. L. DAILY (CCH), July 14, 2015,
2015 WL 4233773.
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Meet Fred Tetro, a Caucasian male and finance manager at a car
dealership.5 After Tetro’s boss, the dealership owner, discovered
Tetro had a biracial daughter, he began ridiculing and insulting Tetro
on different occasions in front of employees and customers. 6 Tetro
overheard the owner on a telephone call discussing how he never
knew Tetro had a biracial child and how this fact would hurt his
dealership and image in the community.7
Now, meet Christopher Vickers, a police officer for a medical
center who befriended a male doctor and a younger male employee at
the medical center.8 Since Vickers developed these platonic
friendships, two coworkers began making homophobic remarks and
alleging that Vickers was gay.9 After learning that Vickers also
vacationed with a former male roommate, his coworkers increased
the frequency and severity of their harassment: tampering with
Vickers’s firearm, putting his life in danger during an arrest,10
constantly referring to him as “fag,” and at times “humping” his
buttocks to suggest he would enjoy anal sex.11
5. Tetro v. Elliott Popham Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick, & GMC Trucks, Inc., 173 F.3d 988, 990
(6th Cir. 1999).
6. Id. Upon Tetro’s biracial daughter visiting him at the car dealership, Tetro’s coworker noticed
the dealership owner roll his eyes in a derogatory manner and immediately walk away. Id. Instead of
aiming insults at his biracial daughter, however, the boss ridiculed and insulted Tetro mainly about his
weight. Id.
7. Id.
8. Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 759 (6th Cir. 2006) (stating Vickers befriended a
homosexual doctor whom Vickers assisted in an investigation regarding sexual misconduct); Complaint
at 16, Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., No. 2:03-CV-858, 2006 WL 5549247 (S.D. Ohio July 19, 2006)
(No. C2-03-858) (stating in August of 2002, Vickers befriended a 17-year-old male employee, named
Josh, who aspired to become a police officer and that coworkers referred to Josh as Vickers’s
boyfriend).
9. Complaint, supra note 8, at 15.
10. Complaint, supra note 8, at 15–17. Vickers alleged that during an arrest, he discovered his
coworkers had previously “double-locked” his handcuffs, requiring a key and two free hands to unlock.
Id. at 17. Vickers had to temporarily take both his hands off the arrestee, which is dangerous during the
apprehension of an arrestee. Id.
11. Complaint, supra note 8, at 18–20. Alleging almost a year of daily harassment, Vickers claimed
the harassment included the following:
impressing the word “FAG” on the second page of Vickers’ report forms,
frequent derogatory comments regarding Vickers’ sexual preferences and
activities, frequently calling Vickers a “fag,” “gay,” and other derogatory names,
playing tape-recorded conversations in the office during which Vickers was
ridiculed for being homosexual, subjecting Vickers to vulgar gestures, placing
irritants and chemicals in Vickers’ food and other personal property, using the
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What is the difference between Tetro and Vickers? In the Sixth
Circuit, Tetro can sue for discrimination under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), while Vickers cannot.12 Title VII
prohibits discrimination against employees because of “such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”13 In the
Sixth Circuit, an employee can sue for discrimination under Title VII
when he faces a hostile work environment because he affiliates with
someone of a certain race—for example, having a biracial daughter—
while an employee cannot sue for discrimination when he faces a
hostile work environment because he affiliates with someone of a
certain sex—for example, having close relationships with other male
employees within the workplace.14 The Sixth Circuit held that Tetro
was discriminated against based on his race, even though the “root
animus” for the discrimination was prejudice against his biracial
child.15 Here, the Sixth Circuit joins other courts16 in adopting
nickname “Kiss” for Vickers, and making lewd remarks suggesting that Vickers
provide them with sexual favors.
Vickers, 453 F.3d at 759. Vickers also asserted that one of his coworker officers, during handcuff
training, handcuffed Vickers and then simulated sex with him while another coworker photographed the
incident. Id. This photograph was then faxed by one of the officers’ wives to the medical center’s
registration center and hung up in the center’s window where several officers, staff, and visitors saw it.
Id. at 759–60. Other complaints alleged two coworkers repeatedly touched his crotch with a tape
measure, grabbed his chest while making derogatory comments, and tried to shove a feminine sanitary
napkin in Vickers’s face. Id. at 760.
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
13. Id. (making it unlawful for any employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin . . . .”).
14. See Tetro v. Elliott Popham Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick, & GMC Trucks, Inc., 173 F.3d 988,
995 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Tetro has stated a claim under Title VII upon which relief can be granted.”);
Vickers, 453 F.3d at 766 (“Vickers has failed to plead a hostile work environment claim.”).
15. Tetro, 173 F.3d at 994. The court reasoned:
If he had been African–American, presumably the dealership would not have
discriminated because his daughter would also have been African–American. Or,
if his daughter had been Caucasian, the dealership would not have discriminated
because Tetro himself is Caucasian. So the essence of the alleged discrimination
in the present case is the contrast in races between Tetro and his daughter.
Id. at 994–95.
16. See Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 556 F.3d 502, 513, 519 (6th Cir. 2009). The Barrett court held
that a reasonable jury could find a Caucasian employee of a Tennessee appliance manufacturing facility
stated a claim under Title VII for race discrimination for harassment due to her friendship with black
employees: “she received a threat of physical violence for reporting racist language, she was subjected
to a regular stream of offensive comments about her relationship with an African-American coworker,
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“affiliative discrimination theory”17—the idea that a person facing
disparate treatment is discriminated against based on that person’s
race when the root animus of the discrimination is the race of
someone else with whom the person affiliates.18
However, in Vickers’s situation—where his coworkers acted
hostile toward him because of his friendship affiliation with other
male employees19—the Sixth Circuit refused to consider this a result
and the same relationship was allegedly used as a reason to prevent her from applying for improved job
positions.” Id.; see also Drake v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 134 F.3d 878, 884 n.3 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[I]n
some instances, harassment will be tied inextricably to an employee’s association with individuals of
another race.” (citing Moffett v. Gene B. Glick Co., 621 F. Supp. 244, 255 (N.D. Ind. 1985)
(“recounting incidents in which the plaintiff, a white woman who was married to a black man, was
subjected to anti-black racist statements from her coworkers”))); Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life
Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding failure to hire a white man as an insurance
salesman on account of his interracial marriage violated Title VII on the basis of race discrimination
because “where a plaintiff claims discrimination based upon an interracial marriage or association, he
alleges, by definition, that he has been discriminated against because of his race”).
17. See infra note 18. Scholarly exploration of this theory of discrimination based on affiliation is
not unprecedented. It has been discussed using artful terms such as “relational discrimination,”
“associative discrimination,” and “third-party associative discrimination.” Victoria Schwartz, Title VII:
A Shift from Sex to Relationships, 35 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 209, 213 n.25, 222 (2012); Matthew Clark,
Comment, Stating A Title VII Claim for Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the Workplace: The Legal
Theories Available After Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, 51 UCLA L. REV. 313, 328 (2003); Mark W.
Honeycutt II & Van D. Turner, Jr., Third-Party Associative Discrimination Under Title VII, 68 TENN. L.
REV. 913, 913 (2001). This Note seeks to not only explore the principles of this theory, as done by the
aforementioned scholars, but to do so by focusing specifically on two cases within the Sixth Circuit. See
infra Part II. Focusing on two cases within the same circuit articulates the inconsistencies that result
when a circuit court adopts affiliative discrimination theory in one context (race) but not another (sex).
Focusing only on two cases also articulates these inconsistencies through fact-to-fact comparison on a
smaller, more comprehendible scale. See infra Part II. This Note further suggests why the Sixth Circuit
should adopt an affiliative discrimination theory for discrimination “because of” sex under Title VII. See
infra Part III. Whereas the term “relational discrimination” may suggest only family relationships to the
exclusion of voluntary social or professional associations and the term “associative discrimination” may
connote the First Amendment right to free association, “affiliative discrimination” is used in this Note
because it more accurately describes a voluntary connection without a strong degree of association
necessary to apply the theory; any degree of affiliation can result in application of the theory. See infra
note 18.
18. The Sixth and Seventh Circuits, in embracing affiliative discrimination theory, agree that the
degree of the association for establishing a claim under the theory is irrelevant (e.g., father/son,
wife/husband, friends). See Barrett, 556 F.3d at 513 (adopting the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Drake
so that “[i]f a plaintiff shows that 1) she was discriminated against at work 2) because she associated
with members of a protected class, then the degree of the association is irrelevant”); Drake, 134 F.3d at
884 (“[W]e do not believe that an objective ‘degree of association’ is relevant to this inquiry.”).
19. Vickers served in what appeared to be a mentorship role to one of the younger employees at the
medical center that aspired to become a police officer, had a close enough friendship with his former
roommate to vacation with him in Florida, and also formed a friendship with one of the male doctors at
the hospital. Vickers, 453 F.3d at 759; Complaint, supra note 8, at 16. “Vickers asserts that he has never
discussed his sexuality with any of his coworkers.” Vickers, 453 F.3d at 759.
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of Vickers’s sex, but rather because of his perceived homosexual
sexual orientation—a type of discrimination that Congress did not
intend to protect according to the Sixth Circuit.20 However, the Sixth
Circuit’s aim, to avoid “bootstrap[ping] protection for sexual
orientation into Title VII” by not adopting affiliative discrimination
theory for sex discrimination cases,21 conflicts with their own Title
VII race jurisprudence and the Supreme Court’s decisions in two
cases: (1) Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, where the Court interpreted
Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination to include employees not
conforming to gender roles (i.e., “sex stereotyping”);22 and (2)
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., where the Court held
Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination to include “reasonably
comparable evils” that were not the “principal evils” Congress
intended to prohibit.23
This Note argues that the Sixth Circuit, in order to maintain
consistent jurisprudence within its own circuit and with the Supreme
Court, should adopt affiliative discrimination theory under sex
discrimination in Title VII as it has done with race discrimination.24
20. Vickers, 453 F.3d at 763 (holding that because “the gender non-conforming behavior which
Vickers claims supports his theory of sex stereotyping is not behavior observed at work or affecting his
job performance . . . the harassment of which Vickers complains is more properly viewed as harassment
based on Vickers’s perceived homosexuality, rather than based on gender non-conformity”). “[A]ny
discrimination based on sexual orientation would be actionable under a sex stereotyping theory if this
claim is allowed to stand, as all homosexuals, by definition, fail to conform to traditional gender norms
in their sexual practices.” Id. at 764. Although “[h]arassment on the basis of sexual orientation has no
place in our society[, c]ongress has not yet seen fit, however, to provide protection against such
harassment.” Id. at 764–65 (quoting Bibby v. Phila. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 265 (3d Cir.
2001)).
21. Id. at 764 (“Like other courts, we have therefore recognized that a gender stereotyping claim
should not be used to bootstrap protection for sexual orientation into Title VII.”) (quoting Dawson v.
Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 2005)).
22. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
23. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998); Brief for Petitioner,
Oncale, 523 U.S. 75 (No. 96-568), 1997 WL 458826, at *6–7. The Court noted that some courts, like
the Fifth Circuit in this case, have held that same-sex sexual harassment claims—where the aggressor
and victim are of the same sex—are never cognizable under Title VII, while other courts maintain that
such claims are actionable only if the plaintiff can prove that the harasser is homosexual, and while still
others suggest that workplace harassment that is sexual in content is always actionable, regardless of the
harasser’s sex, sexual orientation, or motivations. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79.
24. This type of protection has also been extended to national origin. Schwartz, supra note 17, at
221–22 (interpreting the court’s analysis in Reiter v. Ctr. Consol. Sch. Dist. to mean that discriminatory
employment practices based on an individual’s association with people of a particular race or national
origin because of disapproval of such associations due to the individual’s own race or national origin are
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By addressing this inconsistency, the Sixth Circuit will provide
greater protection for sex discrimination, reinforce reliability in Title
VII with a uniform interpretation of race and sex discrimination, and
help victimized employees make informed decisions in calculating
the probability of success in litigating a Title VII sex discrimination
claim. Part I of this Note provides a historical account of the
treatment of race and sex under Title VII.25 Part II analyzes the Sixth
Circuit’s split from its own jurisprudence and the Supreme Court in
adopting affiliative discrimination in Tetro v. Elliott Popham
Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick, & GMC Trucks, Inc. while rejecting this
theory in Vickers v. Fairfield Medical Center.26 Part III proposes that
the Sixth Circuit adopt affiliative discrimination theory for sex
discrimination under Title VII in order to resolve this inconsistency,
alleviate the difficult task of distinguishing between discrimination
based on sex and discrimination based on sexual orientation, and
realize the benefits and increased protection to which citizens are
statutorily entitled.27
I. BACKGROUND
A. Race Under Title VII’s Liberal Construction
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it “an unlawful
employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.”28 Although Title VII’s statutory
language explicitly states “because of such individual’s race,” the
prohibited under Title VII (citing Reiter v. Ctr. Consol. Sch. Dist., 618 F. Supp. 1458, 1460 n.1 (D.
Colo. 1985) (holding that “discriminatory employment practices based on an individual’s association
with people of a particular race or national origin” are prohibited under Title VII))).
25. See infra Part I.
26. See infra Part II.
27. See infra Part III.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). The term “race” has been held to prohibit discrimination
against white as well as black persons. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280
(1976) (“We therefore hold today that Title VII prohibits racial discrimination against the white
petitioners in this case upon the same standards as would be applicable were they Negroes and Jackson
white.”).
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Eleventh Circuit, in the 1986 case of Parr v. Woodmen, was the first
circuit court to broaden the interpretation of this phrase by adopting
affiliative discrimination theory and including the race of another
person with whom one affiliates.29
In Parr, a white man claimed that an insurance company did not
hire him as a salesman because his wife was black.30 In resolving the
Title VII claim, the Eleventh Circuit found “irrefutable” the logic
used in a similar case before the Southern District of New York,
Whitney v. Greater New York Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists:
Manifestly, if Whitney was discharged because, as alleged, the
defendant disapproved of a social relationship between a white
woman and a black man, the plaintiff’s race was as much a
factor in the decision to fire her as that of her friend. Specifying
as she does that she was discharged because she, a white woman,
associated with a black, her complaint falls within the statutory
language that she was ‘[d]ischarged . . . because of [her] race.’31

The Eleventh Circuit also noted that it was obliged to give Title
VII a liberal construction and that it was “the duty of the courts to
make sure that the [Title VII] Act works” and is not “hampered by a
combination of a strict construction of the statute in a battle with
semantics.”32 After Parr, other courts, including the Sixth and
Seventh Circuits, adopted affiliative discrimination theory for Title
VII race claims, allowing citizens to sue for discrimination based on
the race of persons with whom they affiliated—e.g., wives,
daughters, friends, etc.33
29. Schwartz, supra note 17, at 223–24.
30. Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 889 (11th Cir. 1986). The district
court dismissed Parr’s action because the text of the statute proscribed discrimination against his race
and not his wife’s race. Id. at 891.
31. Id. at 891–92 (quoting Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp.
1363, 1366 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)).
32. Id. at 892 (citing Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970)).
33. See Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 556 F.3d 502, 513, 519 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding a reasonable
jury could find a Caucasian employee of a Tennessee appliance manufacturing facility stated a claim
under Title VII for race discrimination after being threatened with physical violence due to her
friendship with black employees); Tetro v. Elliott Popham Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick, & GMC Trucks,
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B. Sex Under Title VII
1. The Road to Actionable Sexual Harassment Claims Under Title
VII
Although the central purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
to prohibit racial discrimination,34 U. S. Representative Howard W.
Smith of Virginia, at the last-minute, led an amendment to include
the protected category of “sex.”35 The principal argument in
opposition to the amendment was that “sex discrimination” was
sufficiently different from other types of discrimination and ought to
receive separate legislative treatment; however, this argument was
defeated.36 Courts lack a detailed legislative history available to
interpret what is inclusive of “sex” under Title VII because this
amendment passed at the last-minute; thus, a lack of certainty and
uniformity exists across jurisdictions.37 In fact, because sexual
harassment was not on the face of the statute, many courts did not
acknowledge it as a cause of action until the Supreme Court’s 1986
decision in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.38
In Meritor, a female bank employee engaged in sexual relations
with her boss out of fear that if she resisted his propositions, she
would lose her job.39 The Court held that this sexual harassment was
Inc., 173 F.3d 988, 995 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding Tetro can sue for discrimination under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 because he affiliates with someone of a different race—his half black
daughter); Drake v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 134 F.3d 878, 884 n.3 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[I]n some
instances, harassment will be tied inextricably to an employee’s association with individuals of another
race.” (citing Moffett v. Gene B. Glick Co., 621 F. Supp. 244, 255 (N.D. Ind. 1985))); Parr, 791 F.2d at
892 (stating a white man alleging an insurance company failed to hire him as an insurance salesman due
to his interracial marriage violated Title VII on the basis of race discrimination because “[w]here a
plaintiff claims discrimination based upon an interracial marriage or association, he alleges, by
definition, that he has been discriminated against because of his race”).
34. Yesenia Gallegos, Note, Sexual Harassment of Female Crewmembers: Title VII’s Weaknesses in
Protecting Women Employed in the Maritime Industry, 15 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 455, 459 (2003) (“The
central purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, however, was not to protect women from sex
discrimination and sexual harassment but to prohibit and remedy race-based employment decisions.”).
35. Id. at 459.
36. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63–64 (1986) (citing 110 CONG. REC. 2577–84
(1964)).
37. Gallegos, supra note 34, at 459–60.
38. Id. at 460; Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. 57.
39. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S at 60.
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a form of discrimination on the basis of sex and thus a violation of
Title VII by creating a hostile or abusive work environment.40 The
Court reasoned that sexual harassment that creates a hostile
environment for members of one sex is a barrier to sexual equality in
the workplace similar to how racial harassment acts as a barrier to
racial equality.41
2. The Supreme Court Focuses on the Entire Spectrum of
Disparate Treatment: Gender Norms & Same-Sex Harassment
In 1989, the Supreme Court acknowledged a new form of sex
discrimination called “sex stereotyping” in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins.42 In Price Waterhouse, a female partnership candidate in an
accounting firm was denied the position because she did not walk,
talk, or dress femininely, and did not wear make-up, wear jewelry, or
style her hair.43 The Court held that “an employer who acts on the
basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must
not be, has acted on the basis of gender.”44 The Court reasoned that
“assuming or insisting” that employees match the stereotype
associated with their sex is prohibited by Title VII, for “Congress
intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men
and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”45 Price Waterhouse led
40. Id. at 66. The Supreme Court also noted that “not all workplace conduct that may be described as
‘harassment’ affects a ‘term, condition, or privilege’ of employment within the meaning of Title VII.”
Id. at 67 (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (stating that “‘mere utterance of an
ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee’ would not affect the
conditions of employment to sufficiently significant degree to violate Title VII”)); Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating same)). “For sexual harassment to be actionable, it
must be sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create
an abusive working environment.’” Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67.
41. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67. The logic was that her boss would not have subjected her to
such propositions for sex if she was a man instead of a woman—making the workplace environment
hostile for women and not men. See id.
42. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–51 (1989).
43. Id. at 235.
44. Id. at 250. Throughout the Price Waterhouse opinion, the Court uses the terms “sex” and
“gender.” See generally id. Early on, the courts defined “sex” as merely biological sex, and interpreted
the provision to only prohibit discrimination against biological men and women (mostly women) for
being a man or being a woman. Cody Perkins, Comment, Sex and Sexual Orientation: Title VII After
Macy v. Holder, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 427, 428 (2013).
45. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 (citing City of Los Angeles, Dep’t of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
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to cases in which Title VII was found to prohibit discrimination
against a male employee who walks and carries his tray like a
woman46 or takes the last name of his female spouse because such
actions are considered non-gender conforming.47
Generally, sexual harassment claims where the parties are of the
opposite sex make it easier for courts to infer that the discrimination
was “because of” sex, since these claims typically involve explicit or
implicit proposals of sexual activity; this made it reasonable to
assume that those proposals would not have been made to someone
of the same sex.48 However, courts have struggled to reach this
inference where the parties were of the same sex and consequently
split on the issue using different approaches.49 In 1998, less than ten
years after Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court resolved this
inconsistency in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. where
a male employee of an eight-man oil crew alleged sexual harassment
after being subjected to sex-related, humiliating actions against him
by male coworkers.50 The Court found harassing conduct need not be
motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination
on the basis of sex.51
46. Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 869–70 (9th Cir. 2001).
47. Koren v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 894 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1038 (N.D. Ohio 2012).
48. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
49. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79 (discussing inconsistencies arise from three different court approaches:
(1) Fifth Circuit’s holding that same-sex sexual harassment claims are never cognizable under Title VII,
(2) other courts’ holdings that such claims are actionable only if the plaintiff can prove that the harasser
is homosexual (and thus presumably motivated by sexual desire), and (3) other courts’ holdings that
workplace harassment sexual in content is always actionable, regardless of the harasser’s sex, sexual
orientation, or motivations (citing Doe v. Belleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997); McWilliams v.
Fairfax Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., 99 F.3d
138 (4th Cir 1996); Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988))).
50. Id. at 77. Over a number of weeks, Oncale alleged being “sexually assaulted, battered, touched,
and threatened with rape by his direct supervisor, John Lyons, and a second supervisor, Danny Pippen,
who, as a driller for Sundowner, exercised de facto control over the terms and conditions of Oncale’s
employment.” Brief for Petitioner, supra note 23, at *4. “The third individual defendant, Brandon
Johnson, [was] a coworker with no apparent supervisory authority . . . .” Id.
51. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. Counsel for Oncale argued the sexual harassment aimed at Oncale
targeted homosexuality because the harassers knew it would specifically degrade and humiliate Oncale
as a male, as opposed to being a female subjected to such harassment. Brief for Petitioner, supra note
23, at *7.
The record confirms that Lyons, Johnson, and Pippen said what they said and did
what they did because Joseph Oncale was a male. They used sexual talk and
activity to demean and humiliate him. They chose their words and conduct
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The Supreme Court acknowledged that Congress did not originally
pass Title VII to prohibit same-sex sexual harassment, but stated that
“statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover
reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our
laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we
are governed.”52 The Supreme Court explicitly stated that protection
from discrimination based on sex “must extend to sexual harassment
of any kind that meets statutory requirements.”53
3. A New Gender Performance Rule to Exclude Sexual Orientation
Under Title VII
After Price Waterhouse, scholars thought homosexual people
would have the right to bring cases under Title VII using the sexstereotyping theory.54 By definition, attraction to someone of the
same sex qualifies a homosexual person as non-conforming to gender
norms.55 However, courts began distinguishing, with much struggle,
between whether the harasser was acting because of the victim’s sex
or because of the victim’s sexual orientation.56 This distinction is
important because it showed that some courts interpreted Title VII
not to protect sexual orientation.57

because Oncale was a man, knowing that such language and conduct would
degrade him as a man.
Id. Additionally, Oncale set out three non-exhaustive ways to establish a claim for same-sex sexual
harassment: (1) showing the harasser is homosexual, (2) showing the harasser is motivated by general
hostility to the presence of a gender in the workplace, or (3) showing direct comparative evidence on
how the harasser treated both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace. Oncale 523 U.S. at 80–81; Shepherd v.
Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1009 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[W]e discern nothing in the Supreme Court’s
decision indicating that the examples it provided were meant to be exhaustive rather than instructive.”).
52. Perkins, supra note 44, at 433.
53. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
54. Perkins, supra note 44, at 429. The claim for homosexuals would be that discrimination was
based either on the stereotype that men should only be attracted to women or women should only be
attracted to men. Id.
55. Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[A]ll homosexuals, by
definition, fail to conform to traditional gender norms in their sexual practices.”).
56. EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 478 (5th Cir. 2013).
57. Perkins, supra note 44, at 429, 429 n.15 (citing Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr.,
Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 703–07 (7th Cir. 2000); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69 (8th
Cir. 1989); and Sarff v. Cont’l Express, 894 F. Supp. 1076, 1084 (S.D. Tex. 1995)).
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In 2000, the Second Circuit in Simonton v. Runyon interpreted
Congress’s rejection of numerous bills extending protection to
individuals based on sexual orientation to justifiably indicate a
“strong congressional intent” not to protect sexual orientation under
Title VII and employed a gender performance rule to distinguish
discrimination because of sex from discrimination because of sexual
orientation.58 The gender performance rule required a male victim of
same-sex sexual harassment, because of his perceived or real
homosexuality, to behave in a stereotypically feminine manner to
show that the harassment was based on nonconformity with male
gender norms instead of his sexual orientation.59
Six years later, the Sixth Circuit in Vickers v. Fairfield Medical
Center, in order to objectively60 determine whether a harasser acted
because of the victim’s sex or sexual orientation,61 adopted
Simonton’s gender performance rule and required the victim to
present evidence of gender nonconformity by appearance or behavior
in the workplace or in a way that affected job performance.62

58. Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Employment Nondiscrimination Act
of 1996, S. 2056, 104th Cong. (1996); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1995, H.R. 1863, 104th
Cong. (1995); and Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1994, H.R. 4636, 103d Cong. (1994)).
We do not have sufficient allegations before us to decide Simonton’s claims
based on stereotyping because we have no basis in the record to surmise that
Simonton behaved in a stereotypically feminine manner and that the harassment
he endured was, in fact, based on his non-conformity with gender norms instead
of his sexual orientation.
Id. at 38. See also Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085–86 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting Congress
has rejected a number of proposed amendments to Title VII to prohibit discrimination based on sexual
orientation).
59. Simonton, 232 F.3d at 38.
60. Boh Bros. Constr., 731 F.3d at 478–79 (“The only objective way for courts or juries to grasp that
a same-sex harasser is acting ‘because of’ the victim’s sex is for the victim (or the harasser) visibly not
to conform to gender stereotype.”).
61. Id. at 478.
62. Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 2006). Vickers did not rely directly on
Simonton in its opinion for the gender performance rule but actually relied on Dawson v. Bumble &
Bumble, a case in the Second Circuit stating that an individual may have a viable Title VII
discrimination claim where the employer acted out of animus toward the employee’s “exhibition of
behavior considered to be stereotypically inappropriate for [the employee’s] gender.” Id. at 763 (quoting
Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 221 (2d Cir. 2005)). However, Dawson’s interpretation of
Price Waterhouse is the same as Simonton’s interpretation—”one can fail to conform to gender
stereotypes in two ways: (1) through behavior or (2) through appearance.” Vickers, 453 F.3d at 763
(quoting Dawson, 398 F.3d at 221); Simonton, 232 F.3d at 38.
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II. ANALYSIS
Part II will first analyze the conflicting reasoning of the Sixth
Circuit’s adoption of affiliative discrimination for “race” in Tetro but
not for “sex” in Vickers under Title VII.63 Next, Part II will examine
the Sixth Circuit’s misapplication of the sex stereotyping theory and
gender performance rule in Vickers to avoid protecting sexual
orientation discrimination and avoid adopting affiliative
discrimination theory.64 Finally, Part II will scrutinize how the Sixth
Circuit’s refusal to adopt affiliative discrimination theory departs
from the Supreme Court’s precedent in Oncale to apply Title VII
protection beyond congressional intent against “reasonably
comparable evils.”65
A. The Sixth Circuit’s Refusal to Adopt Affiliative Discrimination
Theory for Sex Discrimination in Vickers Conflicts with its
Reasoning in Tetro
1. The Sixth Circuit’s Adoption of Whitney’s “Irrefutable” Logic
The backbone of the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in Tetro stems from
the Eleventh Circuit’s reliance on Whitney v. Greater New York
Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists:
Manifestly, if Whitney was discharged because, as alleged, the
defendant disapproved of a social relationship between a white
woman and a black man, the plaintiff’s race was as much a
factor in the decision to fire her as that of her friend. Specifying
as she does that she was discharged because she, a white woman,
associated with a black, her complaint falls within the statutory

63. See infra Part II.A. This analysis discusses the Sixth Circuit’s reliance on the Eleventh Circuit’s
opinion in Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, canons of statutory construction,
and guidance issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. See infra Part II.A.1–2.
64. See infra Part II.B.
65. See infra Part II.C.
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language that she was ‘[d]ischarged . . . because of [her] race.’66

Whitney’s reasoning, considered “irrefutable” by the Eleventh
Circuit, exemplifies the principle underlying affiliative
discrimination theory: “[w]here a plaintiff claims discrimination
based upon an interracial marriage or association, he alleges, by
definition, that he has been discriminated against because of his
race.”67 In Tetro, a Caucasian plaintiff faced adverse treatment
because of his interracial association with his biracial daughter; thus,
his adverse treatment was, by definition, because of his race.68 The
Court reasoned further that if Tetro had been African-American or
his daughter Caucasian, presumably the dealership would not have
discriminated against him.69
In Vickers, similar elements exist for the court to conclude that
Vickers’s coworkers discriminated against him because of his sex.70
Vickers faced adverse treatment from his fellow police officers
because of his same-sex association with medical center employees
and his former roommate; thus, his adverse treatment was, by
definition, because of his sex. 71 If Vickers or his associates had been
66. Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 891–92 (11th Cir. 1986) (quoting
Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363, 1366 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)).
67. Id. at 892; see also Whitney, 401 F. Supp. at 1366.
68. Tetro v. Elliott Popham Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick, & GMC Trucks, Inc., 173 F.3d 988, 994–95
(6th Cir. 1999).
69. Id. at 995 (“The net effect is that the dealership has allegedly discriminated against Tetro
because of his race.”).
70. Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 761 (6th Cir. 2006). While Vickers did not raise
affiliative discrimination as a theory of sex discrimination but only raised a theory of sex stereotyping
before the Sixth Circuit, Vickers did claim disparate treatment based on his sex under Title VII and the
court effectively rejected affiliative discrimination theory by determining that discrimination based on
Vickers’s perceived homosexual relationship with other males was not based on Vickers’s sex but his
perceived sexual orientation (unlike what the court would have likely done in a Title VII race case). Id.
(“The complaint alleged sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation in violation of Title
VII . . . .”).
71. Id. at 759.
Once his co-workers found out about the friendship, Vickers contends that Dixon
and Mueller “began making sexually based slurs and discriminating remarks and
comments about Vickers, alleging that Vickers was ‘gay’ or homosexual, and
questioning his masculinity.” Vickers asserts that following a vacation in April
2002 to Florida with a male friend, Dixon’s and Mueller’s harassing comments
and behavior increased.
Id. Vickers befriended a seventeen-year-old male employee, named Josh, who aspired to become a
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female, certainly his coworkers would not have discriminated against
him with daily homophobic remarks, sexual touching to exemplify
homosexual acts, and other hostile treatment related to
homosexuality. The “net effect,” as the Sixth Circuit phrased it in
Tetro, is that the defendants discriminated against Vickers because of
his sex.72 Following Whitney’s logic, if Vickers was discriminated
against because the defendants disapproved of a social relationship
between two males, Vickers’s sex was as much a factor in the
decision to discriminate against him as his associate’s sex—this falls
within Title VII’s statutory language as an actionable claim.73
2. The Sixth Circuit’s Reliance on Canons of Statutory
Construction & Guidance from the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission
The Sixth Circuit in Tetro also found support for applying
affiliative discrimination to the protected category of race by relying
on the canons of statutory construction and guidance from the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).74 This same
reasoning supports applying affiliative discrimination theory to the
protected category of sex in Vickers.
a. Applying the Cardinal Canon of Legislative Purpose
In Tetro, the court found that the absence of words like “directly”
or “indirectly” in the statute, concerning how a person may
discriminate “because of such individual’s race,” created

police officer and his coworkers referred to Josh as Vickers’s boyfriend. Complaint, supra note 8, at 16.
72. See Tetro, 173 F.3d at 995 (“The net effect is that the dealership has allegedly discriminated
against Tetro because of his race.”).
73. Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 891–92 (11th Cir. 1986) (quoting
Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363, 1366 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)).
For a disparate treatment claim, “showing that discrimination was a ‘motivating’ or ‘substantial’ factor
to shift the burden of persuasion to the employer” is sufficient; Congress does not require “but-for
causality.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012) (“[A]n unlawful employment practice is established
when the complaining party demonstrates that race color, religion, sex, or national origin was a
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.”);
Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 889 n.4 (2014).
74. See infra Part II.A.2.a–c.
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ambiguity.75 Consequently, the court applied the “cardinal” canon of
statutory construction: interpreting statutes “harmoniously with their
dominant legislative purpose.”76 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that, on
its face, Title VII broadly protects “victims of discriminatory animus
towards third persons with whom the individuals associate” and its
purpose is consistent with the affiliative discrimination alleged by
Tetro.77
The Sixth Circuit’s determination that the lack of words like
“directly” or “indirectly” renders “race” ambiguous means that “sex”
is ambiguous because Title VII protected traits of “race” and “sex”
are in the same sentence; thus, an inquiry into the legislative purpose
is necessary.78 Before Title VII’s passage, and upon the amendment
to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for the inclusion of the term “sex,” it
was argued that “sex discrimination” was sufficiently different from
other types of discrimination and ought to receive separate legislative
treatment.79 The defeat of this argument sends a clear message that
legislators intended to treat “race” and “sex” in the same manner.
Because the Sixth Circuit determined that Title VII’s legislative
history supports a broad construction of “race,” to include Tetro’s
claim based on the relationship between his race and the race of his
daughter with whom he associates,80 one could reasonably argue that
the legislative history supports a broad construction of “sex” to

75. Tetro, 173 F.3d at 995 (citing Nixon v. Kent Cty., 76 F.3d 1381, 1394 (6th Cir. 1996) (Keith, J.,
dissenting)).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 994 (“[C]ourts . . . have broadly construed Title VII to protect individuals who are the
victims of discriminatory animus towards third persons with whom the individuals
associate . . . . Similarly, we find that Tetro has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted under
Title VII.”) (citing Parr, 791 F.2d at 890; Chacon v. Ochs, 780 F. Supp. 680, 680–81 (C.D. Cal.1991);
and Whitney, 401 F. Supp. at 1366)).
78. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin . . . .
Id.; see also Tetro, 173 F.3d at 995.
79. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63–64 (1986) (citing 110 CONG. REC. 2577–84
(1964)).
80. See Tetro, 173 F.3d at 995.
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include Vickers’s claims based on the relationship between his sex
and the sex of people with whom he associates with. To interpret
otherwise is not harmonious with Title VII’s dominant legislative
purpose and violates the cardinal canon of construction.
b. Applying “Noscitur a Sociis”—Defining a Word by the
Company it Keeps
When a statutory word is vague or ambiguous, courts may clarify
its meaning and intent by referencing the surrounding words or
phrases.81 Noscitur a sociis, or “it is known from its associates,” is a
well-settled statutory canon: “a word may be defined by an
accompanying word, and that, ordinarily, the coupling of words
denotes an intention that they should be understood in the same
general sense.”82 Because the Sixth Circuit has already identified and
determined ambiguity exists within Title VII, it is proper to apply
noscitur a sociis to ascertain the legislative meaning of the term
“sex” in the statutory phrase, “because of such individual’s sex.”83
“Race” and “sex” are words that appear, albeit not immediately,
within the statute one after the other: “It shall be . . . unlawful . . . to
discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .”84 In accordance
with noscitur a sociis, the coupling of “race,” “sex,” and other
outlined categories denotes a legislative intent to understand these
categories in the same general sense.85 In race discrimination cases
like Tetro, courts understand the statutory relationship between
“because of” and the enumerated word “race” to include a prohibition
of discriminatory animus towards the race of third persons with
81. NORMAN SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES & STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 47:16 (7th ed. 2007).
82. Id.
83. Tetro, 173 F.3d at 995 (citing Nixon v. Kent Cty, 76 F.3d 1381, 1394 (6th Cir. 1996) (Keith, J.,
dissenting)); SINGER & SINGER, supra note 81, § 47:16 (“The maxim noscitur a sociis is only a guide to
legislative intent . . . and so, like any rule of construction, does not apply absent ambiguity . . . .”).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .”).
85. SINGER & SINGER, supra note 81, § 47:16.
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whom individuals associate.86 In sex discrimination cases like
Vickers, the court must also embrace that proper statutory
construction supports a relationship between “because of” and the
enumerated word “sex” to include a prohibition of discriminatory
animus towards the sex of third persons with whom individuals
associate. This equal treatment of “race” and “sex” is also supported
by the defeat of the argument among legislators in 1964 that “sex
discrimination” was sufficiently different from other types of
discrimination upon passing Title VII. 87 Therefore, sex should be
understood as encompassing affiliative discrimination along the same
line of reasoning given to race.88

86. Tetro, 173 F.3d at 995 (citing Nixon v. Kent Cty, 76 F.3d 1381, 1394 (6th Cir. 1996) (Keith, J.,
dissenting)); see also SINGER & SINGER, supra note 81, § 47:16.
87. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63–64 (1986) (citing 110 CONG. REC. 2577–84
(1964)).
88. Beyond applying affiliative discrimination theory to race, courts have also broadly interpreted
“national origin” to embrace affiliative discrimination, consistently holding that Title VII protects an
individual who is discriminated against because of his or her relationship with someone of a different
national origin. Schwartz, supra note 17, at 211. In Chacon v. Ochs, a Caucasian woman brought action
under Title VII alleging that she was subjected to a hostile work environment because she was married
to a Hispanic man. Chacon v. Ochs, 780 F. Supp. 680, 680 (C.D. Cal. 1991). The EEOC defines
Hispanic as “[a] person of Cuban, Mexican, Puerto Rican, South or Central American, or other Spanish
culture or origin regardless of race.” U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, OMB. NO. 3046-0007,
INSTRUCTION BOOKLET: STANDARD FORM 100, EMPLOYER INFORMATION REPORT EEO-1 (2006),
http://www.eeoc.gov/employers/eeo1survey/upload/instructions_form.pdf. Also, the EEOC maintains
that “[n]ational origin discrimination involves treating people (applicants or employees) unfavorably
because they are from a particular country or part of the world, because of ethnicity or accent, or
because they appear to be of a certain ethnic background (even if they are not).” National Origin
Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/
nationalorigin.cfm (last visited Nov. 18, 2014). The court in Chacon noted that the different jurisdictions
that have considered “whether Title VII violations include discriminatory employment practices based
on an individual’s association with people of a different national origin” were divided on the issue.
Chacon, 780 F. Supp. at 681. Ultimately, though, the court relied on the “irrefutable” logic in Whitney
and held that the better-reasoned decisions recognize such a Title VII violation. Chacon, 780 F. Supp. at
681; Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363, 1366 (S.D.N.Y.
1975). Although the court did not go through a statutory analysis using noscitur a sociis, it is evident
that it seemed compelled to treat national origin as encompassing affiliative discrimination in a similar
manner as the holding in Whitney treated race. Chacon, 780 F. Supp. at 681; Whitney, 401 F. Supp. at
1366.
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c. The EEOC Interprets Title VII to Prohibit Sexual Orientation
Discrimination
Additionally, the Sixth Circuit in Tetro supported its decision with
guidance from the EEOC.89 The Tetro court noted that the EEOC,
charged by Congress to interpret, administer, and enforce Title VII,
has consistently held that “an employer who takes adverse action
against an employee or a potential employee because of an interracial
association violates Title VII.”90 The Supreme Court has also held
that the EEOC’s administrative interpretation of Title VII is entitled
to “great deference.”91 Although the EEOC adopted affiliative
discrimination theory for race discrimination cases arising under Title
VII at the time Tetro and Vickers were decided, the EEOC had not
found Title VII to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination under
Title VII’s purview of sex discrimination.92 A recent review of
EEOC decisions, however, suggests that the Sixth Circuit should also
adopt affiliative discrimination theory for sex discrimination cases,
especially considering the Supreme Court’s instruction to give “great
deference”93 to administrative interpretations of Title VII.

89. Tetro, 173 F.3d at 994.
90. Id. (citing Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 1986)).
91. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1971) (finding good reason to treat the
guidelines as expressing the will of Congress where the Commission’s construction is supported by the
Act and legislative history); see Rosanna McCalips, Note, What Recent Court Cases Indicate About
English-Only Rules in the Workplace: A Critical Look at the Need for A Supreme Court Ruling on the
Issue, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 417, 419–20 (2002) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (2012)).
92. Following the Tetro and Vickers decisions, “the [EEOC] . . . has made great strides . . . [toward]
recognizing in non-binding decisions that discrimination based on sexual orientation falls under sex
stereotyping and is therefore covered under Title VII.” Perkins, supra note 44, at 430 (citing Castello v.
Donahoe, Appeal No. 0120111795, 2011 WL 6960810, at *3 (EEOC Dec. 20, 2011) (holding that
Castello alleged a plausible sex stereotyping case which would entitle her to relief under Title VII after
being subjecting to discriminatory remarks by her manager motivated by the sexual stereotype that
having relationships with men is an essential part of being a woman and Castello’s failure to adhere to
this stereotype); Veretto v. Donahoe, Appeal No. 0120110873, 2011 WL 2663401, at *3 (EEOC July 1,
2011) (finding a plausible sex stereotyping case where a man alleged he was harassed because he
intended to marry another man)). See also Hitchcock v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Appeal No.
0120051461, 2007 WL 1393665 (EEOC May 3, 2007). Essentially, the EEOC maintains the view that
“when lesbian, gay, and bisexual federal employees allege hostile work environments based on sexstereotyping, they may be entitled to relief under Title VII.” Verónica Caridad Rabelo & Lilia M.
Cortina, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Gender Harassment and Heterosexist Harassment in LGBQ Work
Lives, 38 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 378, 386 (2014).
93. Tetro, 173 F3d. at 994 (citing Griggs, 401 U.S. at 434).
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On July 15, 2015, in Complainant v. Anthony Foxx, the EEOC
definitively held that discrimination based on sexual orientation is
considered sex discrimination within Title VII’s statutory meaning
and is a violation of the statute.94 Foxx involved a male air traffic
controller’s allegation that his employer, the Federal Aviation
Administration, refused to hire him for a permanent position as a
Front Line Manager because he identifies as gay.95 During the
selection process, the complainant claimed that his supervisor “made
several negative comments about [c]omplainant’s sexual
orientation,” like stating he did not “need to hear about that gay
stuff” when complainant mentioned his partner, and that
complainant’s male partner was “a distraction in the radar room.”96
In reversing and remanding its previous decision, and dismissing
the complaint on procedural grounds of timeliness, the EEOC on
appeal found the claim was raised in a timely fashion and held an
employee “alleging that an agency took his or her sexual orientation
into account in an employment action necessarily alleges that the
agency took his or her sex into account.”97 The agency reasoned:
Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is premised
on sex-based preferences, assumptions, expectations,
stereotypes, or norms. “Sexual orientation” as a concept cannot
be defined or understood without reference to sex. A man is
referred to as “gay” if he is physically and/or emotionally
attracted to other men. A woman is referred to as “lesbian” if she
is physically and/or emotionally attracted to other women.
Someone is referred to as “heterosexual” or “straight” if he or
she is physically and/or emotionally attracted to someone of the
opposite-sex. It follows, then, that sexual orientation is
inseparable from and inescapably linked to sex and, therefore,
that allegations of sexual orientation discrimination involve sex94. Complainant v. Anthony Foxx, Sec’y, Dep’t of Transp. (Fed. Aviation Admin.), Appeal No.
0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *1 (EEOC July 15, 2015).
95. Id.
96. Id. at *2.
97. Id. at *5, *10.
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based considerations.98

Additionally, the EEOC directly addressed affiliative
discrimination theory: “An employee alleging discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation is alleging that his or her employer took
his or her sex into account by treating him or her differently for
associating with a person of the same sex.”99 The EEOC explained
that its “analysis is not limited to the context of race discrimination,”
and that Title VII “‘on its face treats each of the enumerated
categories—race, color, religion, sex, and national origin —’ exactly
the same.”100 As another finding, the court found that “sexual
orientation discrimination also is sex discrimination because it
necessarily involves discrimination based on gender stereotypes.”101
Similarly, Vickers contended, “the facts alleged in [his] complaint
establish[ed], as the district court found, that the discrimination
Vickers experienced was motivated by Vickers’[s] perceived
homosexuality . . . .”102 In alleging that his coworkers created a
hostile work environment of adverse treatment toward him after
taking his perceived sexual orientation103 into account, the district
court and court of appeals should have concluded such action
necessarily alleges his coworkers took his sex into account.
Acknowledging that Vickers’s sex was taken into account amounts to
discrimination because of his sex.
Finally, Vickers also claimed his coworkers were motivated by the
stereotype that men should not have close friendships with or
mentorship from other men, and thus, coworkers treated Vickers
adversely because he did not conform to male stereotypes.104
Although Vickers never stated that he was homosexual, the

98. Id. at *5.
99. Id. at *6.
100. Foxx, 2015 WL 4397641, at *7 (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 243 n.9
(1989)).
101. Id. at *7.
102. Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 761 (6th Cir. 2006).
103. “[I]ndividuals who are perceived as or who identify as homosexuals are not barred from bringing
a claim for sex discrimination under Title VII.” Id. at 762.
104. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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calculated sexual harassment based on Vickers’s perceived
homosexuality sent a message to Vickers that he did not live up to his
coworkers’ stereotype of a real man— “‘real’ men are attracted to
women” and refrain from developing close relationships with other
men.105 The EEOC interprets Title VII to cover this type of treatment
as prohibited under the category of “sex” discrimination.106
B. The Sixth Circuit Misapplied the Sex Stereotyping Theory &
Gender Performance Rule in Vickers to Avoid Protecting Against
Sexual Orientation Discrimination
Because the Sixth Circuit refused to adopt affiliative
discrimination theory in Vickers by determining that Vickers’s claim
was based on sexual orientation and not “sex,” the question arose
whether homosexual sexual orientation was protected by sexstereotyping as gender non-conforming behavior.107 To decide, the
Sixth Circuit adopted and applied Simonton’s gender performance
rule—a rule not adopted by the Supreme Court—108 by requiring
Vickers to present evidence of not conforming to gender in only
appearance or behavior in the workplace.109 Then, the court solely
focused on feminine non-conforming behavior, overlooking other
ways in which Vickers, a male, exhibited observable non-gender
conforming behavior at work.110 This allowed the court to conclude
105. Vickers, 453 F.3d at 759 (“Vickers asserts that he has never discussed his sexuality with any of
his coworkers.”); Todd Brower, Social Cognition “At Work”: Schema Theory and Lesbian and Gay
Identity in Title VII, 18 LAW & SEXUALITY 1, 52 n.331 (2009).
106. See Brower, supra note 105, at 10 n.43.
107. Vickers, 453 F.3d at 761 (“As a result, Vickers argues, his claim is covered under the sex
stereotyping theory of liability embraced by the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins . . . .”).
108. The Sixth Circuit in Vickers mentions the “Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse focused
principally on characteristics that were readily demonstrable in the workplace, such as the plaintiff’s
manner of walking and talking at work, as well as her work attire and her hairstyle,” but then applies a
“hard-and-fast” rule that requires the plaintiff to present only evidence of appearance or behavior
observable in the workplace. Id. at 763.
109. See cases cited supra note 62 and accompanying text.
110. Vickers, 453 F.3d at 763 (focusing on cases where successful plaintiffs behaved or appeared only
in a manner of the opposite sex and not in other non-gender conforming ways); see e.g., Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989) (female partner candidate described as “macho” and a
“tough-talking somewhat masculine hard-nosed” manager); Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729,
733 (6th Cir. 2005) (a male-to-female transsexual living as a male while on duty and living as a woman
while off duty); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 568 (6th Cir. 2004) (a transsexual man that began
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that Vickers’s complaint under sex stereotyping failed to state a
claim.111
A closer look at the facts of the case reveals that Vickers’s
behavior was, in fact, nonconforming to his gender as a stereotypical
male within the workplace. Vickers alleged that upon developing a
close mentorship with a seventeen-year-old male employee who
aspired to become a police officer, his coworkers made homophobic
remarks and called the younger employee Vickers’s “boyfriend.”112
While mentorship is not considered feminine behavior per se,
Vickers’s coworkers clearly viewed men developing close
relationships with other young men as non-masculine behavior that
did not match their perceptions of how a man should act.113 The court
directly acknowledged that Vickers’s coworkers considered these
male relationships as him “questioning his masculinity.”114 Vickers
further alleged he was harassed about his close friendship with a
former roommate with whom he vacationed.115 This friendship
incited coworkers to call him “fag” and increase the frequency and
severity of their behavior.116 Once, Vickers used his former
“expressing a more feminine appearance on a full-time basis”).
111. Vickers, 453 F.3d at 763–64.
Vickers has made no argument that his appearance or mannerisms on the job were
perceived as gender non-conforming in some way and provided the basis for the
harassment he experienced. Rather, the harassment of which Vickers complains is
more properly viewed as harassment based on Vickers’[s] perceived
homosexuality, rather than based on gender non-conformity.
Id. at 763.
112. Complaint, supra note 8, at 16 (stating that in August of 2002 Vickers befriended a seventeenyear-old male employee, named Josh, who aspired to become a police officer and that coworkers
referred to Josh as Vickers’s boyfriend).
113. See id. His coworker even referred to him as a “bitch,” a pejorative used to refer to feminine
men. Id. at 37. See Michael J. Vargas, Title VII and the Trans-Inclusive Paradigm, 32 LAW & INEQ. 169,
185 n.102 (2014) (“When applied to women it is easily recognizable as pejoratives such as ‘bitch,’ but
the same language is often used to harass men as well, suggesting that all sexual harassment is primarily
an attack on real or perceived feminine characteristics.”).
114. Vickers, 453 F.3d at 759 (“Once his coworkers found out about the friendship, Vickers contends
that Dixon and Mueller ‘began making sexually based slurs and discriminating remarks and comments
about Vickers, alleging that Vickers was “gay” or homosexual, and questioning his masculinity.’”).
115. Complaint, supra note 8, at 15.
116. Id. at 18. Vickers also alleged that during an arrest, he discovered his coworkers had previously
“double-locked” his handcuffs, requiring a key and two free hands to unlock. Id. at 17. “Double-locked”
handcuffs placed Vickers in danger during the apprehension of the arrestee because Vickers had to
temporarily take both of his hands off the arrestee. Id.
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roommate’s cellphone to call the medical center and find out what
time he had to report to work.117 His coworker responded to him
calling from another man’s phone by ridiculing Vickers with
homophobic slurs and sending harassing messages to his friend’s
phone after the conversation.118 Moreover, Vickers’s mentor
relationship and friendship with a male doctor began and existed at
the medical center workplace, and his close relationship with his
former roommate entered the workplace in an observable way (being
harassed through his friend’s phone by coworkers on duty at
work).119 Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit was not persuaded that these
behaviors were non-conforming to gender in an observable way at
work.120
The Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse did not require that
plaintiffs only conform in observable ways, such as behavior or
appearance, in the workplace or only in ways representative of the
opposite gender to succeed on a sex discrimination claim under Title
VII.121 The Court merely required that the plaintiffs not “match[] the
stereotype associated with their group, for . . . ’Congress intended to
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
women resulting from sex stereotypes.’”122 The Court focused on the
fact that the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse was not feminine enough,
and the Court held as sufficient any evidence that showed
nonconformity with being a stereotypical female.123 Thus, the
conclusion in Vickers that Price Waterhouse’s theory of sex
stereotyping is not broad enough to encompass Vickers’s claim for
discrimination because of sex is actually the result of a
misapplication of the sex stereotyping theory and gender
performance rule.124

117. Id. at 18.
118. Id. at 18–19.
119. Id. at 15.
120. Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 2006).
121. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251–52 (1989).
122. Id. at 251 (quoting L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
123. Id. at 235.
124. See Vickers, 453 F.3d at 763 (“We conclude that the theory of sex stereotyping under Price
Waterhouse is not broad enough . . . .”).
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C. The Sixth Circuit’s Refusal to Adopt Affiliative Discrimination
Theory for Sex Under Title VII Conflicts with Oncale’s Application of
Title VII Protection Beyond Congressional Intent Against
“Reasonably Comparable Evils”
The Sixth Circuit held that Vickers’s sexual harassment from
coworkers was a result of his perceived sexual orientation rather than
his sex.125 The Sixth Circuit also reasoned that allowing Vickers’s
claim would “bootstrap” sexual orientation into Title VII and
improperly amend Title VII de facto to encompass sexual orientation
against Congress’s intent.126 However, this logic does not comport
with the Supreme Court’s interpretation in Oncale of what should be
included under Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination because of
“sex.”127
Oncale involved a male employee of an eight-man crew on an oil
platform who alleged sexual harassment after being forcibly
subjected to sex-related, humiliating actions by male coworkers,
including name-calling suggesting he was homosexual.128 The
Supreme Court stated that “male-on-male sexual harassment in the
workplace was assuredly not the principal evil Congress was
concerned with when it enacted Title VII”; however, “statutory
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably
comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws
rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are
governed.”129 The Court held as actionable any kind of sexual
harassment that met statutory requirements, stating Title VII broadly
125. Id. (holding that because “the gender non-conforming behavior which Vickers claims supports
his theory of sex stereotyping is not behavior observed at work or affecting his job performance, . . . the
harassment of which Vickers complains is more properly viewed as harassment based on Vickers’[s]
perceived homosexuality, rather than based on gender non-conformity”).
126. Id. at 764–65.
127. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79–80 (1998) (“[S]tatutory
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately
the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are
governed.”).
128. Id. at 77 (stating coworkers “called him a name suggesting homosexuality”). Over a number of
weeks, Oncale alleges being “sexually assaulted, battered, touched, and threatened with rape . . . .” Brief
for Petitioner, supra note 23, at *4.
129. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79.
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prohibits “‘discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . sex’ in the ‘terms’ or
‘conditions’ of employment.”130
Although Oncale did not involve a male plaintiff affiliating in
close, social relationships with other males in the workplace,131 it is
significant to note that the Supreme Court extended Title VII
protection to same-sex sexual harassment while acknowledging this
was not the principal evil that Congress was concerned with
prohibiting.132 Before Oncale, some courts, like the Fifth Circuit,
held same-sex sexual harassment claims were never cognizable under
Title VII because gender discrimination133 was the principal evil
Congress intended to prohibit.134 This is essentially a congressional
intent argument similar to the argument made by the Sixth Circuit in
Vickers,135 which gauged congressional intent based on the fact that
later congresses repeatedly rejected legislation136 that would have
extended Title VII to cover sexual orientation.137
130. Id. at 79–80.
131. Plaintiffs Vickers and Oncale alleged similar acts of sexual harassment although Oncale did not
allege sex stereotyping. Compare Brief for Petitioner, supra note 23, at *4, with Complaint, supra note
8, ¶¶ 10.I–J, 10.N. In his complaint, Vickers alleged being subjected to “unwanted offensive
touching . . . while [a coworker] simulating performing anal sex on him,” approaches from behind and
grabbing of his breast, and multiple touchings of his crotch and genital area. Complaint, supra note 8, 5–
7.
132. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79.
133. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refers to “gender discrimination” as equal treatment of
both men and women. See Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451–52 (5th Cir. 1994),
abrogated by Oncale, 523 U.S. at 75.
134. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78–79 (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s holding that same-sex sexual
harassment claims are never cognizable under Title VII); see also Garcia, 28 F.3d at 452 (“‘Title VII
addresses gender discrimination.’ Thus, what [male Defendant] did to [male Plaintiff] could not in any
event constitute sexual harassment within the purview of Title VII, and hence summary judgment in
favor of all defendants was proper on this basis also.”) (citation omitted).
135. Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 765 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Bibby v. Phila. CocaCola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 265 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Harassment on the basis of sexual orientation has
no place in our society. Congress has not yet seen fit, however, to provide protection against such
harassment.”)).
136. The Second Circuit noted that “congressional inaction subsequent to the enactment of a statute is
not always a helpful guide,” but nevertheless considered this strong evidence of congressional intent.
Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000).
137. Vickers, 453 F.3d at 765. In the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Vickers, the court relied on the Second
Circuit’s decision in Bibby v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co. in stating Congress has yet to
prohibit harassment based on perceived homosexual sexual orientation. Id. (citing Bibby, 260 F.3d at
265). Bibby reached this conclusion not based on legislative history but the fact that Congress repeatedly
rejected legislation that would have extended Title VII to cover sexual orientation. Bibby, 260 F.3d at
261.
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Thus, not only has the Sixth Circuit erroneously derived this
congressional intent to exclude sexual orientation based on legislative
inaction and not actual legislative history,138 but the Supreme Court
has already held that Title VII’s protection reaches beyond
Congressional intent.139 The Sixth Circuit’s rejection of affiliative
discrimination theory for sex discrimination under Title VII conflicts
with the broad interpretation the Supreme Court has applied in
construing discrimination on the basis of sex in Oncale.
The Supreme Court states that “the critical issue, Title VII’s text
indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to
disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which
members of the other sex are not exposed.”140 If Vickers had been
female, certainly his coworkers would not have harassed him for
building close relationships with male employees, especially
considering the alleged harassment consisted of daily homophobic
remarks.141 Vickers’s discrimination is inherently based on his sex,
and the Supreme Court’s holding that Title VII broadly prohibits
“‘discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . sex’ in the ‘terms’ or
‘conditions’ of employment” mandates the Sixth Circuit find
Vickers’s claim actionable as discrimination because of sex.142
III. PROPOSAL
The Sixth Circuit effectively avoided adopting affiliative
discrimination theory for Title VII sex discrimination by not
identifying the cause of the discrimination as sex, but rather as sexual
orientation.143 However, this placed the cause within the ambit of sex
stereotyping protection because the court, by its own admission, has
138. The Supreme Court has held “[c]ongressional inaction lacks ‘persuasive significance’ because
‘several equally tenable inferences’ may be drawn from such inaction, ‘including the inference that the
existing legislation already incorporated the offered change.’” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV
Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990).
139. See Simonton, 232 F.3d at 35; see also Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79.
140. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring)).
141. See discussion supra Part II.A.1; see also supra note 11 and accompanying text.
142. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79–80.
143. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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recognized homosexuality is inherently gender non-conforming.144
Thus, to avoid protecting sexual orientation under Title VII, the Sixth
Circuit misapplied the sex stereotyping theory by creating two extra
requirements: (1) that plaintiffs only conform in ways observable in
the workplace (the gender performance rule), and (2) that plaintiffs
non-conform in ways representative of only the opposite gender.145
The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Vickers not only appears unguided
by an accurate interpretation and application of Title VII, sex
stereotyping theory, and Supreme Court jurisprudence, but by an
impetus to not protect sexual orientation under Title VII.146 This Note
proposes that the Sixth Circuit abandon precluding sexual orientation
under Title VII by adopting affiliative discrimination theory for sex
discrimination in order to resolve the aforementioned inconsistencies
in interpretation and application; relieve courts from attempting the
difficult task of distinguishing between discrimination because of sex
and discrimination because of sexual orientation; and realize the
benefits and increased protection to which citizens are statutorily
entitled.147
A. The Sixth Circuit Should Stop Pursuing the Unreasonable Idea of
Precluding Sexual Orientation Under Title VII’s “Sex” Category
The Sixth Circuit should recognize the unreasonableness of
separating sexual orientation from protection under Price
144. Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 2006). “[A]ny discrimination based
on sexual orientation would be actionable under a sex stereotyping theory if this claim is allowed to
stand, as all homosexuals, by definition, fail to conform to traditional gender norms in their sexual
practices.” Id.
145. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989). The Supreme Court in Price
Waterhouse did not impose the requirement that plaintiffs only conform in ways observable (behavior or
appearance) in the workplace but only in ways representative of the opposite gender to succeed on a sex
discrimination claim under Title VII. Id.
146. See Vickers, 453 F.3d at 763–66. The Sixth Circuit misinterpreted Title VII by creating an
inaccurate congressional intent to exclude sexual orientation based on legislative inaction of later
congresses and not actual legislative history. Id. at 765. The Sixth Circuit also misapplied sex
stereotyping theory to exclude sexual orientation protection by creating extra evidentiary requirements
for plaintiffs. See discussion supra Part II.B. Finally, the Sixth Circuit misapplied Supreme Court
jurisprudence from Oncale that instructs federal courts to apply Title VII protection beyond
congressional intent against “reasonably comparable evils” that meet statutory requirements. Oncale,
523 U.S. at 79–80; Vickers, 453 F.3d at 765.
147. See infra Part III.A–B.
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Waterhouse’s broad interpretation of Title VII discrimination
“because of sex.” The Sixth Circuit, in its 2006 Vickers decision,
states clearly why this is unreasonable: “all homosexuals, by
definition, fail to conform to traditional gender norms in their sexual
practices.”148 These sexual practices fail to conform because they
occur between members of the same sex.149
The Sixth Circuit in Vickers inquired about the cause of the
discrimination just enough to find prejudice against homosexuality150
as the “root animus” and not enough to find that the true “essence” of
discrimination against homosexuals is their sex.151 Black’s Law
Dictionary defines “homosexual” as relating to or characterized by
sexual desire for a person of the same sex.152 Creating a hostile work
environment for a male employee because he is perceived as being
attracted to another male takes into account and hinges on the fact
that the employee is male, himself. Thus, the comparison of his sex
to his associate’s sex is the essence of the discrimination. If he were
female, the discrimination would not occur. The relevant inquiry
should be whether an enumerated category pertaining to the
employee is the essence of the discrimination.
Put differently, it would seem highly unreasonable for the Sixth
Circuit to state that a white employee discriminated against because
he is married to a black woman has no recourse under Title VII
because interracial marriage is not specifically listed as prohibited
discrimination within the statute. While interracial marriage might be

148. Vickers, 453 F.3d at 764.
149. Id. at 763 n.2. In arguing for Title VII protection, Vickers alleged he was teased about fellatio
and anal sex with males. Id.
150. Id. at 763 (“[T]he harassment of which Vickers complains is more properly viewed as
harassment based on Vickers’[s] perceived homosexuality, rather than based on gender nonconformity.”).
151. Tetro v. Elliott Popham Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick, & GMC Trucks, Inc., 173 F.3d 988, 994
(6th Cir. 1999) (holding despite the root animus for the discrimination being a prejudice against the
biracial child, the essence of the discrimination is the comparison in races between Tetro and his
daughter because “[i]f [Tetro] had been African-American, presumably the dealership would not have
discriminated”). Here, despite the root animus for the discrimination being a prejudice against
homosexuality, the “essence” of the discrimination is the comparison of Vickers’s sex to his male
mentee, the male doctor at the medical center, and his former male roommate. If Vickers had been
female, presumably his coworkers would not have discriminated against him. See id.
152. Homosexual, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 853 (10th ed. 2014).

Published by Reading Room, 2016

29

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 6

570

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:2

the motivation for discrimination, the essence of the discrimination is
the comparison of the employee’s race to his wife’s race. If one of
them were a different race, no discrimination would occur. The same
logic should apply when a male employee is discriminated against
because he is perceived to have a romantic relationship with another
man. While homosexuality might be the motivation for
discrimination, the essence of the discrimination is the comparison of
the employee’s sex to his perceived mate’s sex. If one of them were
of a different sex, the discrimination would not occur.
Yet, the Sixth Circuit takes an unreasonable approach in stating
that there is no recourse under Title VII because sexual orientation is
not specifically listed as prohibited discrimination within the statute.
This argument is illogical and why the Sixth Circuit’s jurisprudence
conflicts with Price Waterhouse.153 This notion is even more
unreasonable considering the Sixth Circuit’s strongest argument, that
their opinion is not based on actual legislative history but that later
congresses have not amended the statute to specifically list “sexual
orientation” as a protected category.154 Gauging the intent of recent
Congresses, however, is an unreasonable method to gauge the intent
of Congress when passing Title VII. The Supreme Court has held
“[c]ongressional inaction lacks ‘persuasive significance’ because
‘several equally tenable inferences’ may be drawn from such
inaction, ‘including the inference that the existing legislation already
incorporated the offered change.’”155

153. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989) (stating “an employer who acts on
the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of
gender”). This leads to the inference that an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman
cannot be attracted to other women, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender. See id.
154. See Vickers, 453 F.3d at 765; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). Congress similarly has not amended
Title VII to include racial orientation (plaintiff’s attraction and marriage to a black woman in Parr v.
Woodmen of the World Life Insurance Co.), interracial friendship, or interracial affiliation, yet these
have all been found by different courts to be protected under Title VII. See Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp.,
556 F.3d 502, 513, 519 (6th Cir. 2009); Drake v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 134 F.3d 878, 884 n.3 (7th
Cir. 1998); Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 1986).
155. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990) (quoting United States v.
Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411 (1962)).
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B. Citizens Will Benefit If the Sixth Circuit Adopts Affiliative
Discrimination Theory for “Sex” Under Title VII
1. Consistent Jurisprudence That Citizens Can Rely On
The Sixth Circuit should adopt affiliative discrimination theory for
sex discrimination under Title VII to ensure predictable and stable
law, which would give citizens a greater sense of security and
certainty when litigating claims under Title VII.156 If courts treated
“race” and “sex” uniformly under Title VII, citizens would not have
to gamble and guess about how the Court would rule in litigating sex
discrimination.157 When the Sixth Circuit adopted affiliative
discrimination for race under Title VII in Tetro, the principle of stare
decisis—which aims to create predictability and preserve stability in
the law—required adherence to the same rationale for “sex” under
Title VII.158
Beyond intra-circuit consistency, adopting this theory would create
consistency between the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of
discrimination “because of sex” under Title VII and the Supreme
Court’s broad interpretation of the same.159 The Supreme Court’s
Price Waterhouse decision instructs courts to provide relief when an
employee is subjected to discrimination because they do not conform
to sex stereotypes.160 Affiliative discrimination theory is in
accordance with the Court’s policy because it permits relief when a
male employee is subjected to discrimination because he does not
conform to masculine stereotypes by building close relationships
156. 21 C.J.S. Courts § 194 (2006).
The rule of stare decisis is founded largely on considerations of judicial efficiency
and sound principles of public policy, to preserve the continuity, predictability
and stability of the law . . . . The theory is that when a legal principle is accepted
and established . . . security and certainty require that the principle be
subsequently recognized and followed . . . .
Id.
157. See id.
158. See id.; Tetro v. Elliott Popham Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick, & GMC Trucks, Inc., 173 F.3d 988,
994 (6th Cir. 1999).
159. See discussion supra Part II.B.
160. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989) (“[A]n employer who acts on the
basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of
gender.”).
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with other males in the workplace. The Supreme Court’s Oncale
decision instructs federal courts to provide relief when members of
one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of
employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed,
even when such discrimination is beyond the principal congressional
intent of Title VII.161 Affiliative discrimination theory is also in
accordance with the Court’s decision because the theory permits
relief when a male employee is subjected to discrimination as a result
of maintaining a social relationship with other males when he would
not have received such treatment were he female.
2. More Protection Without the Fear of Title VII Becoming a
General Civility Code
Adopting affiliative discrimination theory for sex discrimination
under Title VII would also increase protection for citizens while not
transforming the statute into a general civility code.162 A general
civility code is a complete prohibition of “all verbal or physical
harassment at the workplace.”163 The Supreme Court and the Sixth
Circuit maintain that “Title VII is not a ‘general civility code’ for the
workplace [and] it does not prohibit harassment in general.”164 The
possible concern, if the Sixth Circuit adopts affiliative discrimination
161. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (citing Harris v. Forklift
Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)).
162. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. Recognizing liability for same-sex harassment will not transform
Title VII into a general civility code for the American workplace, since Title VII is directed at
discrimination because of sex, “not merely [conduct] tinged with offensive sexual connotations . . . .” Id.
at 81. Recognizing liability for same-sex harassment also will not transform Title VII into a general
civility code for the American workplace because “the statute does not reach genuine but innocuous
differences in the ways men and women routinely interact . . . [and] the objective severity of harassment
should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering all
the circumstances.” Id.
163. Elizabeth Monroe Shaffer, Comment, Defining the “Environment” in Title VII Hostile Work
Environment Claims: Appellate Courts, Classism, and Sexual Harassment, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 695, 700
(2002).
164. Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 766 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Spearman v. Ford Motor
Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1085 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding male employee “who endured threatening and hostile
statements, taunting, and graffiti did not establish hostile work environment claim because his
coworkers ‘maligned him because of his apparent homosexuality, and not because of his sex’”)). See
Shaffer, supra note 163, at 700 (“The [Supreme] Court further explained that Title VII is not a ‘general
civility code’ for the American workplace . . . .”).
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theory for sex discrimination cases, is that Title VII would morph
overnight into a general civility code for the American workforce is
unfounded for the same reasons enunciated by the Supreme Court’s
holding in Oncale that same-sex sexual harassment was actionable
under Title VII: the statute is “directed at discrimination because of
sex, not merely conduct tinged with offensive sexual
connotations.”165 The Court also pointed out that Title VII “does not
reach genuine but innocuous differences in the ways men and women
routinely interact” and that there is an additional hurdle to clear in
that “the objective severity of harassment should be judged from the
perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position,
considering all the circumstances.”166
Permitting individuals to sue for discrimination because of sex
under affiliative discrimination theory can only happen after the
aforementioned hurdles are cleared as well. The plaintiff must still
show that the discrimination was because of his sex by alleging facts
on par with a male plaintiff being treated adversely as a result of his
close affiliation with another male.167 Additionally, the Court
continues to charge the plaintiff with alleging severity beyond simple
teasing or roughhousing and conduct which a reasonable person in
the plaintiff’s position would find severely hostile or abusive.168 The
Sixth Circuit found the specific harassment alleged by Vickers

165. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 (finding no justification in Title VII’s language or the Court’s precedents
for a categorical rule barring a claim of discrimination “because of . . . sex” merely because the plaintiff
and the defendant were of the same sex).
166. Id. at 81.
167. See id.
168. Id. at 81–82. The Supreme Court elaborates further on what constitutes severely or pervasively
abusive:
In same-sex (as in all) harassment cases, that inquiry requires careful
consideration of the social context in which particular behavior occurs and is
experienced by its target. A professional football player’s working environment is
not severely or pervasively abusive, for example, if the coach smacks him on the
buttocks as he heads onto the field—even if the same behavior would reasonably
be experienced as abusive by the coach’s secretary (male or female) back at the
office. The real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a
constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which
are not fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts
performed.
Id.
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“unacceptable and repugnant,” the Second Circuit found a case of
similarly alleged conduct “appalling persecution,” and the Third
Circuit regards harassment on the basis of sexual orientation in
general to be conduct that “has no place in our society.” 169 These
hurdles not only prevent Title VII’s conversion into a general civility
code, but also prevents a flood of litigation in federal courts.
3. Entitlement to Partial Protection Where Congress Has Failed to
Act
Another benefit of adopting affiliative discrimination theory for
sex under Title VII is affording certain real or perceived homosexual
plaintiffs at least partial protection to which they are statutorily
entitled.170 While this Note advocates that sexual orientation
discrimination is, indeed, discrimination because of sex under Title
VII,171 it should be acknowledged that adopting affiliative
discrimination theory for sex under Title VII is not comprehensive
protection for discrimination based on sexual orientation. At the heart
of this theory is the idea that an employee is discriminated against
based on sex when the employee affiliates with someone of the same
sex;172 no protection exists for employees targeted with
discrimination simply because the individual is perceived as or
identifies as homosexual in the workplace. Therefore, establishing a
claim would also require establishing an affiliation or relationship of
some type with someone of the same sex.173 This form of underprotection is why Congress must continue its attempt to pass an
Employment Non-Discrimination Act that includes sexual
orientation, as it has attempted many times in the past.174
169. Vickers, 453 F.3d at 765; Bibby v. Phila. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 265 (3d Cir.
2001); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000).
170. As previously discussed, real or perceived homosexual plaintiffs discriminated against based on
their affiliation with persons of the same sex are statutorily entitled to protection under Title VII because
jurisprudence and statutory construction support application of affiliative discrimination theory similar
to race claims. See discussion supra Part II.A.1–2.
171. See supra Part III.A.
172. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
173. Id.
174. Simonton, 232 F.3d at 35 (citing Employment Nondiscrimination Act of 1996, S. 2056, 104th
Cong. (1996); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1995, H.R. 1863, 104th Cong. (1995); and
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The most recent attempt to pass such legislation was a sexual
orientation inclusive version of the Employment Non-Discrimination
Act that looked promising after passing the U.S. Senate on November
7, 2013, but the bill never passed in the House.175 Until there is
legislative action to amend workplace protections to include sexual
orientation discrimination, circuit court adoption of affiliative
discrimination theory for sex discrimination under Title VII provides
at least some statutory protection for homosexual plaintiffs facing, in
the words of the Sixth Circuit, “unacceptable” and “repugnant”
treatment in the workplace.176
CONCLUSION
On the heels of the 50th Anniversary of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,177 it is incumbent to reflect on the broad spectrum of injustice
that Title VII was meant to prohibit. Justice Scalia phrased it best
when, delivering for the unanimous opinion in Oncale, he stated that
“statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover
reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our
laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we
are governed.”178 Title VII does not prohibit some discrimination
because of sex but “the entire spectrum of disparate treatment.”179
Adopting affiliative discrimination theory is an important step in
the right direction for the Sixth Circuit in ending the unreasonable
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1994, H.R. 4636, 103d Cong. (1994)); Ulane v. E. Airlines,
Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085–86 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting Congress has rejected a number of proposed
amendments to Title VII to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation)); Rabelo & Cortina,
supra note 92, at 386.
175. Rabelo & Cortina, supra note 92, at 386; Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815,
113th Cong. (2013).
176. Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 764–65 (6th Cir. 2006) (stating “the harassment
alleged by Vickers reflects conduct that is socially unacceptable and repugnant to workplace standards
of proper treatment and civility”). See also Bibby v. Phila. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 265
(3d Cir. 2001) (“Harassment on the basis of sexual orientation has no place in our society.”); Simonton,
232 F.3d at 35 (“[Harassment on the basis of sexual orientation] is morally reprehensible whenever and
in whatever context it occurs, particularly in the modern workplace.”).
177. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
178. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
179. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (citing L.A. Dept. of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
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notion that real or perceived homosexual sexual orientation is not
within the ambit of protection under Price Waterhouse’s broad
interpretation of Title VII sex discrimination. 180 This step would also
give citizens a greater sense of security and certainty when litigating
claims under Title VII without the fear of transforming the statute
into a general civility code.181 Finally, in the absence of Congress
amending Title VII to include sexual orientation, this step would
provide some statutory protection to which some citizens of
homosexual sexual orientation are entitled.182

180. See supra Part III.A.
181. See supra Part III.B.1–2.
182. See supra Part III.B.3.
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